Around the year 98, the Roman senator Publius Cornelius Tacitus finished a short book about the peoples living beyond the Rhine. He had almost certainly never seen them. He worked from older accounts, among them a lost history of the German wars by Pliny the Elder, and he wrote with one eye on Rome. But in the eleventh chapter of the Germania he set down, plainly, how these people decided things.
Small matters were left to the chiefs. Large matters belonged to everyone. The assembly met on fixed days, at the new moon or the full, because those were held to be the most favourable times to begin business. The men came armed and sat down armed. Priests called for silence, and had the right to enforce it. Then the king or a chief was heard, according to his age, his rank, his record in war or his gift for speaking, and he was heard on the strength of his power to persuade rather than any power to command.
If the assembly disliked what it heard, it rejected the proposal with a murmur. If it agreed, the men struck their spears together. To praise with weapons, Tacitus wrote, was their most honourable form of assent.
He noted one fault. The free men did not arrive together, or as if under orders; a second and a third day were often lost waiting for the last of them. He called it a vice that came from their liberty: ex libertate vitium.
The Floor Plan, Reversed
The previous article in this series ended at RAND in January 1950, with John Nash explaining why the first run of the Prisoner’s Dilemma had produced the wrong answer. The players had seen too much of each other. To restore the theory, rotate them so that no one meets the same partner twice, and keep everyone ignorant of the others’ choices until the trials are over.
Set that remedy beside Tacitus’s chapter.
Nash wanted strangers. The assembly was made of the same men, meeting at every new and full moon for as long as they lived. Nash wanted ignorance of the others’ moves. In the assembly every proposal was heard by all, and every answer was given aloud, in iron, in front of everyone who would have to live with it. Nash wanted each round to stand alone. The assembly was nothing but the next round, and the round after that, across a lifetime and into the lives of sons.
The chief who stood up to speak could not order anyone to cooperate. He could only make his case to men who knew him, and who would remember next month what he had said this month.
In the twelfth chapter Tacitus adds that the assembly was also a court. Accusations could be brought there, including capital ones. Lesser wrongs were settled in horses and cattle, part of the fine going to the community and part to the injured man or his kin. For the gravest offences there was death, and the punishment was carried out in public, so that the crime would be seen. Tacitus names the men the assembly hanged from trees: traitors and deserters.
In the language of the game, the defector.
The Field at Þingvellir
Historians have long read Tacitus’s chapter as an early glimpse of the institution that later Germanic sources call the Thing. Nine centuries and a sea separate the Roman’s second-hand report from the fullest record of that institution, which comes from Iceland.
In the summer of 930, the settlers of Iceland established a general assembly, the Althing, and gave it a meeting place in a rift valley east of the later capital. The place was called Þingvellir, the assembly plains. Every summer, for two weeks, the chieftains came, and with them farmers, traders, craftsmen, storytellers and anyone with a quarrel to settle. Any free man could attend. There was no building. The assembly met in the open, beneath a rock wall from which a single strong voice carries across the valley.
From that place, the Law Rock, the assembly’s only salaried official spoke. The lawspeaker was chosen for three years, and at each summer’s assembly he recited a third of the law in force, so that over his term the whole of it had been spoken aloud to the people bound by it. In the first generations there was no written code to consult. The law was what the assembly had heard, and what it could remember.
The Icelandic Commonwealth had no king, no standing army and no police. It enforced its law with one instrument, applied with care. A man convicted of a serious offence could be sentenced to lesser outlawry: three years’ exile abroad, with safe passage to a ship. For the gravest cases there was full outlawry, skóggangr, which meant literally “going to the forest.” The full outlaw lost his property and every protection of the law; anyone could kill him without penalty, and anyone who sheltered him risked the same sentence.
Iceland had no prisons. It did not lock the defector in a room. It put him outside the field.
What the Mathematicians Found Later
The first article in this series described Robert Axelrod’s tournaments of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which a simple strategy of returning cooperation for cooperation and defection for defection beat every sophisticated rival. In 1984 Axelrod gathered his findings into a book, The Evolution of Cooperation, and gave the decisive condition a name. Cooperation can emerge among pure egoists, without any central authority, provided the shadow of the future is long enough. The players must expect to meet again, and must care about that meeting.
A man who faced the same neighbours at every full moon for forty years lived under a very long shadow.
In December 1968, the biologist Garrett Hardin published an essay in Science called “The Tragedy of the Commons.” It opened with an image: “Picture a pasture open to all.” Each herdsman, reasoning alone, adds one more animal, since the gain is his and the damage is shared. Every herdsman reasons the same way, and the pasture is ruined. The essay became one of the most reprinted in the history of the journal, and generations of readers took from it a simple lesson: a shared pasture must either be divided among private owners or placed under an authority from above.
The political scientist Elinor Ostrom went to look at real pastures. One of her central cases was Törbel, a mountain village in the Swiss canton of Valais, whose families had held their alpine meadows, forests and irrigation channels in common for centuries. Legal documents concerning the village’s land reached back to 1224. In 1483, the villagers signed articles forming an association to govern the commons. By 1517 they had set a rule that no one could send more cows to the summer pasture than he could feed through the winter. Land bought by an outsider did not carry the right to use the commons. The pasture had not been open to all. That was why it survived.
In 1990 Ostrom published Governing the Commons, drawn from Törbel and from fisheries, irrigation systems and village meadows across the world. She distilled from them a set of design principles shared by communities that had governed common resources for generations. The community knows who belongs to it. Those bound by the rules take part in making them. The users watch one another. Penalties rise with the seriousness of the offence. Disputes are settled close to home and cheaply. And no outside authority overrides the community’s right to organise itself.
In 2009 she became the first woman awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Two years later the village of Törbel gave her a reception.
Her first principle is that a community must know who belongs to it. In 1950, the attachment to one’s own group was an item on the F-scale.
What Became of the Field
The Commonwealth lasted a little over three centuries. In 1262, after a generation of feuding between the great chieftain families, the Icelanders accepted the authority of King Haakon IV of Norway under the terms of the Old Covenant, the Gamli sáttmáli, which took full effect in 1264. Executive power passed to the king and his officials. The Althing lost its power to make law and became, for most purposes, a court. It went on meeting at Þingvellir, under the same rock wall, for more than five hundred years.
In 1800 it was dissolved by royal decree, and a new High Court in Reykjavík took over its remaining functions.
On 8 March 1843, another royal decree provided for its restoration. Elections were held the following year, and on 1 July 1845 the new Althing met for the first time: in Reykjavík, in the hall of the Latin School. It had no power to legislate; it was a consultative body. In 1881 it received a house of its own, built of hewn stone.
For eight and a half centuries the assembly had gathered under the open sky. When it was given back, it was given a room.
A Question for the Field
The first article in this series described a game that produces betrayal only when the players are kept apart. The second followed the men who drew the walls, each for a reason of his own, and watched what they built escape them. This one has looked at what stood there before the walls: a field, a moon, the same faces, a law spoken aloud, and a forest for the man who betrayed it.
None of it was hidden. It was written down by a Roman at the end of the first century, kept in an alpine village archive since 1483, and honoured in Stockholm in 2009.
In Old English, the word þing meant an assembly, a meeting of free men to settle what concerned them all. It survives in that sense in the names of parliaments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavík. In English it has come to mean any object at all.
If the answer was set down by a Roman in the year 98, kept by mountain farmers since 1483, and awarded a Nobel Prize in 2009, why does every textbook still begin with two men in separate cells?
This article concludes the series. Previously: Two Prisoners and Who Built the Room.


